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THE ANATOMY OF CHEVRON:
STEP TWO RECONSIDERED*
RONALD

M. LEVIN**

One of my former students wrote to me recently: "I never pull
into a Chevron station without thinking of you." Isn't that
heartwarming? Perhaps I have been underestimating the extent to
which the aura of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.' pervades the administrative law course and lodges in
the consciousness of impressionable students. On the other hand, one
thing I have surely never underestimated is the allure of Chevron for
academics. Scholarship about that case has been the single hottest
topic in the administrative law literature of the past decade.2 Like the
products of the Chevron Corporation, however, analyses of Chevron
can be either crude or refined, and I hope this article will fall into the
latter category.
More specifically, the concern of this article is the internal structure of what has become known as the two-step Chevron test. I begin,
therefore, by quoting the familiar formula by which, according to the
Supreme Court, a reviewing court is to evaluate an interpretation of a
regulatory statute by the agency that administers the statute:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,

that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
* A dozen years ago I wrote an article with the self-explanatory title Identifying Questions
of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Levin, Identifying Questions of
Law]. I mentioned in a footnote that I was "now preparing" a sequel on how questions of law in
administrative law should be resolved. I did not fulfill that plan-partly because I chose to
pursue other projects, but also because of the boom in case law and scholarship on Chevron,
which rendered the original conception of the anticipated article obsolete. In subsequent years,
a few readers (I would as soon not disclose how few) have inquired about the promised sequel.
They, and all others who may have been eagerly awaiting the sequel, should please assume that
this is it. Or at least it comes as close as anything I am likely to write. Some of the ideas in this
article appeared in somewhat different form in Ronald M. Levin, Scope of Review Legislation:
The Lessons of 1995, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 647 (1996) [hereinafter Levin, Lessons of 1995].
** Professor of Law, Washington University. I thank Roy D. Schotland and the participants in the Chicago-Kent Law Review symposium on administrative law for their comments on
an earlier draft of this article.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. For a non-exhaustive list of forty-seven "principal" articles on Chevron, see John F.
Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 35, 36 n.3 (1995).
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If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the stat-

ute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a
3
permissible construction of the statute.

The main question that I will explore here is: What is the meaning
or role of the second step in the Chevron formula? In other words, if
an interpretation does not contravene the clear intent of Congress, on
what grounds can it nevertheless be deemed "impermissible"? The
4
voluminous literature on Chevron has little to say on this subject.
The District of Columbia Circuit, which uses Chevron as the basis
for analysis of administrative interpretations more consistently than
any other court, has been troubled by the jurisprudence of step two.
It has been especially puzzled about the relationship between step two
and the traditional "arbitrary and capricious" test prescribed in
§ 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 5 The
D.C. Circuit sees an "overlap" or kinship between the two standards
of review, but has been at something of a loss to know how to define
6
their respective domains.
I will propose for consideration a simple solution to this quandary: these two steps in the review process should be deemed not just
overlapping, but identical. 7 If the courts would define the scope of the
Chevron step one inquiry and of arbitrariness review as broadly as
3. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
4. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2104-05 (1990) (devoting only two paragraphs to step two in a fifty-page survey of Chevron
issues). Among the principal exceptions to the general neglect are Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions,48 RUtrGERS L. REV.
313 (1996); and Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). This standard of review goes by various names, including
"abuse of discretion" and "rational-basis review," all of which are interchangeable. For convenience I will usually call it the arbitrariness test.
6. See, e.g., Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1995), discussed infra Part III.C.
7. One major exception to this generalization should be noted. Among the functions of
the arbitrariness test is to supply a standard by which courts can review purely factual findings
made by administrative agencies in proceedings for which Congress has not specified a different
standard of review. No one supposes, however, that the Chevron test has any direct bearing on
the question of whether an agency's fact findings have adequate support. In this article I will
refrain from continually reminding the reader of this exception, because as a practical matter
courts seldom have difficulty distinguishing purely factual issues from normative issues during
judicial review proceedings. The "factual" aspect of arbitrariness review is, therefore, readily
severable from its other aspects. Of course, the exception discussed in this footnote does not
even come into play in the numerous proceedings that do have a statutory standard of review for
factual issues. The substantial evidence test of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1994), is the most
obvious example, but there are many others. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
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they should, there would be no need for a separate and distinct Chevron step two, and that test could simply be absorbed into arbitrariness
review. If this notion were generally accepted, analysis of merits issues during judicial review could immediately become less complicated, without any necessary alteration in the substance of the court's
tasks. At the same time, this solution would make application of
Chevron step two more administrable, because courts and litigants
could look directly to the vast body of case law and commentary on
abuse of discretion review as a guide to the meaning of that aspect of
the Chevron standard.
Let me be clear on what this article is not about. Much, or perhaps most, of the literature on Chevron has focused on the question of
whether one should approve or disapprove of the broad judicial deference to administrative agencies that, in the authors' view, is commanded by that case. 8 This theme, which is often couched in
separation of powers terms, is only peripherally related to my subject.
Furthermore, despite the prominence of the arbitrariness test in my
analysis, I also will not explore whether that test is being applied too
intrusively or too deferentially. Thus I will steer clear of the ongoing
debate in the academic literature over whether the so-called hard look
doctrine, the dominant version of the arbitrariness test, is contributing
to the stiling or "ossification" of the rulemaking process. 9
All of those issues are important, but for present purposes I will
assume that the courts' review standards are likely to remain just
about as intrusive as they now are. As a social scientist might say, I
will hold those variables constant, so that I can examine the doctrinal
framework within which they interact. If, as a result of the critiques
that I have just mentioned (or for other reasons), judicial review becomes either more or less deferential in the future than it is now, the
structural issues that this article analyzes will still require attention. 10
The theoretical refinements that I will discuss are intended to serve
comparatively neutral ends: simplicity and clear thinking in scope of
review doctrine, improved communication among participants in the
278, 291 (1960) (construing 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) as prescribing "clearly erroneous" test for review
of Tax Court findings).
8. See, e.g., infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
9. A recent colloquy in the Texas Law Review between Professors Seidenfeld and McGarity provides an enlightening exploration of this issue. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification
of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997).
10. At least, these issues will remain relevant if we assume that the two-step Chevron test
will continue to exist in some form. I explain in Part I why it probably will.
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judicial review process, and the increased legitimacy that courts may
attain if they are seen as using an accessible framework over time.
Regardless of the outcome of current debates over levels of deference,
those goals should be appealing in their own right.

I.

THE DOMESTICATION OF CHEVRON

Although Chevron is undoubtedly the "leading case" on judicial

review of agencies' statutory interpretation, the past thirteen years
have seen shifting perceptions about where, and to what extent, the
case really "leads." I obviously cannot review the entire development
of the doctrine here, but I will sketch briefly a conception of the role

of Chevron in our contemporary judicial review system, because that
conception is the starting point for the main business of this article.
The initial announcement of Chevron gave rise to a widespread

belief that the Court had finally decided to put an end to inconsistencies in its case law by announcing a definitive test for judicial defer-

ence to administrative interpretations of statutes. 1 That perception
took hold with particular force in the D.C. Circuit, the forum with the
2
greatest frontline responsibility for judicial review of agency action.'

This belief was usually coupled in the literature with an assumption
that the Chevron test meant that courts were to become much more
deferential to agencies than had been customary in the past. Whether
or not that was the Court's intent, lower courts did in fact start treating Chevron as a leading case. 13 Meanwhile, the law reviews swelled
with commentary approving 14 or disapproving1 5 of this putatively bold
move.
11. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283 (1986).
12. See, e.g., Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1069-70 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Mikva,
J.) ("We emphasize that our review of the Administrator's determination will of course be
guided by the principles of deference articulated in Chevron."); Transbrasil S.A. Linhas Aereas
v. Department of Transp., 791 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wald, C.J.) ("As always, our
review of an agency's statutory interpretation takes off from Chevron."); Starr, supra note 11.
13. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An EmpiricalStudy of
FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984. Reportedly, another factor contributing to the
"making" of this landmark case was that the Solicitor General's office made aggressive use of
Chevron in arguing lower court appeals, while at the same time purposefully avoiding calling
attention to it in the Supreme Court in a manner that might lead to an inconvenient "clarification" from the Court. See Thomas W. Merrill, Confessions of a Chevron Apostate, ADMIN. L.
NEWS, Winter 1994, at 1, 14.
14. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987).
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From the outset, however, the supposition that Chevron was intended to effect a major transformation in the law of deference was
not unanimous. 16 After all, some reasoned, why would the Court undertake to settle such a far-reaching matter as the standard of review
for legal issues in administrative law in a case in which only six Justices
participated? Moreover, the opinion contained internal evidence that
the Court did not really subscribe to the widely held assumption that
Chevron called for deference to agency interpretations in almost all

circumstances. 17 A recent peek behind the scenes at the Court has

seemed to vindicate the opinions of those who doubted the ambitions
of the decision: A scholar who has examined the file on Chevron in
the papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall at the National

Archives reports that it contains no evidence that any Justice saw the
case as anything other than a routine environmental opinion. 18
Regardless of what the Court originally intended, however, we
now know that experience has not borne out the early predictions of a
sea change in judicial deference. A strong revisionist view has
emerged, interpreting Chevron as less deferential than many initially
15. See, e.g., Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers
in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757 (1991); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).
16. See Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 247 n.4 (1986) [hereinafter Levin, Restatement Report]
(making fleeting reference to Chevron, which "has not yet become well established"). I cite this
report, an elaborate compilation of doctrine developed under the auspices of the Section of
Administrative Law of the American Bar Association, in order to document my own skepticism
as of that time, and also (more importantly) to make the point that the large group of practitioners and scholars who contributed ideas to the report did not, generally speaking, assume that
Chevron displaced prior doctrine as to deference on questions of law. See also Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 976 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill,
Executive Precedent] ("[Tihere is reason to believe the participating Justices did not regard
Chevron as a departure from prior law.").
17. Footnote 9 of Chevron declares:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent [citing
eight cases]. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains
that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law
and must be given effect.
467 U.S. at 843 n.9. If "opinion leaders" of administrative law had paid more attention at the
outset to this fairly moderate language from the opinion, instead of less restrained passages,
perhaps the interpretation of Chevron as a prescription for near judicial passivity would never
have taken hold. But footnote 9, which does not fit with the overall "image" of the Chevron
opinion, is often not taken very seriously. Witness several well-regarded casebooks on public
law that have reprinted the case with the footnote edited out. See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 171 (2d ed. 1994); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 858 (2d ed. 1995); GLEN 0. ROBINSON ET AL., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
530 (4th ed. 1993).
18. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlightsfrom the
Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,606, 10,613 (1993).
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assumed. 19 The clearest sign of the need for a reassessment has been
the post-Chevron behavior of the Supreme Court. As studies by Professor Thomas Merrill have demonstrated, the Supreme Court itself
has not, in the years since Chevron, been noticeably more deferential
towards agencies' constructions of the statutes they administer than it
had been prior to that decision. 20 Small wonder, then, that lower
courts are observed to be failing to heed the "original" message of the
Chevron case.2 1 The Supreme Court's actions speak more loudly than
(some of) the words of its most prominent case do, and those actions
scarcely create the sort of consistent signal that would effectively impose discipline on a court of appeals panel that might be inclined to
override an agency interpretation.
Nevertheless, the prestige of Chevron lingers on. The allure of a
single unifying framework for review of agencies' statutory interpretations has been strong. And perhaps the durability of Chevron has
been enhanced by the very fact that it has turned out to be less confining than the early notices had suggested. In fact, the understanding
that Chevron is a leading case on deference has now percolated
upwards and finds sporadic, though far from consistent, recognition in
the Supreme Court. Thus, in that Court, as elsewhere, jurists periodically speak of "Chevron" as shorthand for "the principle of deference
'22
on questions of statutory interpretation.
A well-known lecture on Chevron by Justice Scalia2 3 encapsulates
much of the revisionist perspective. What he liked about Chevron was
the universality or near universality of its framework, a vast improve24
ment over what he regarded as the unpredictable state of prior law.
He effectively uncoupled that aspect of the case from the theme of
sweeping deference to agencies: he himself found room in the opinion
for courts to play a substantial role in identifying "clear" congres19. See, e.g., William S. Jordan, I1, Deference Revisited: Politics as a Determinant of Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 NEB. L. REV. 454, 484 (1989);

Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 Mo. L. REV. 129 (1993).
20. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill, Textualism]; Merrill, Executive Precedent, supra note 16.
21. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, JudicialIncentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1070-71 (1995).

22. See, e.g., Dunn v. CFTC, 117 S.Ct. 913, 920 n.14 (1997) (declining to rely on "Chevron
principles" because statute seemed clear); Nationsbank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S.
Ct. 810, 813 (1994) (describing the Chevron two-step test as "the formulation now familiar").
23. Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511.
24. See id. at 516-17.
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sional constraints on administrative action. 25 The question of "how
26
clear is clear?" would, he predicted, dominate subsequent debate.
Justice Scalia's analysis has proved prophetic. Today's reviewing
courts regard Chevron as useful in providing a manageable framework, yet critical judicial scrutiny of administrative actions has continued. In other words, the flexibility that we have always seen in the
courts' use of the deference concept has not disappeared, but it is now
usually oriented around Chevron terminology. Of particular importance to this essay, the D.C. Circuit, which never interpreted Chevron
as a command to abandon serious evaluation of the merits of agency
interpretations, 27 continues to use the Chevron framework with great
consistency. 2 8 Similarly, a number of commentators who are not particularly inclined to endorse judicial deference have made their peace
with Chevron; they seek to reinterpret it, not dislodge it.29
In short, the principal question about judicial deference to administrative constructions has become, not whether the courts can live
with Chevron, but how they can domesticate it for everyday use. To
be sure, courts and commentators continue to debate whether various
classes of cases should be regarded as falling outside the scope of the
Chevron test.30 Nevertheless, the applicability of the formula to the
25. See id. at 520-21.
26. See id.
27. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 13, at 1041-42 (noting lower affirmance rate in D.C.
Circuit than in other circuits).
28. See Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy PartnershipBetween
Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 242 (1996). See also PETER L. STRAUSS ET
AL.,

GELLHORN

&

BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW: CASES

AND COMMENTS

620 (9th ed. 1995)

(quoting Judge Wald's advice in a 1994 speech to practitioners: "Now for you agency case lawyers. Chevron is the password. In every case involving statutory interpretation, think Chevron."). Of course, whether the D.C. Circuit's holdings are "consistent" with Chevron in the
sense of being faithful to its spirit is debatable, because it depends on one's view of what the
Supreme Court intended to accomplish. Those who assume, as I do not, that the Court wished
to strike a dramatic blow for deference tend to see the D.C. Circuit as rebellious. See, e.g., John
F. Belcaster, The D.C. Circuit's Use of the Chevron Test: Constructinga Positive Theory of Judicial Obedience and Disobedience, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 745 (1992).
29. See Seidenfeld, supra note 4; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2105. See also Levin, Lessons of
1995, supra note *, at 655-57 (describing how proponents of regulatory reform legislation in the
104th Congress claimed that their bill would codify some form of Chevron, even though they
wanted to move towards broaderjudicial scrutiny of agency interpretations).
30. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and
the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 42 (1990) (arguing that Chevron should not apply to interpretations issued in informal "formats"); Timothy B. Dyk & David Schenck, Exceptions to Chevron,
ADMIN. L. NEWS, Winter 1993, at 1, 13-16 (identifying nine situations in which courts have suggested that Chevron may not apply); Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It's a Crime?: Chevron
Deference to Agency Interpretationsof Regulatory Statutes that Create Criminal Liability, 58 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1996).
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great majority of judicial review proceedings is widely conceded. 3 1
Accordingly, I believe that certain flaws in the Chevron framework,

which I will explain in the next section, must be considered in light of
an assumption that Chevron will likely continue for the foreseeable
future to be regarded as the "leading case." Any remedies for these
flaws are likely to come from reinterpretation of Chevron, not from its

overthrow.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF STEP

Two

I have said that Chevron is attractive to the courts because it appears to offer a fairly manageable framework. As regards the second
step in the Chevron test, however, appearances may be misleading. A
brief look at the face of the Chevron opinion exposes some of the
questions it raised about how the second step should be applied. The
Court initially framed step two as a question of whether the agency's
interpretation is "permissible, '32 but that phrasing was circular: obviously an interpretation that is not permitted is prohibited, but on what
grounds would the Court refuse to "permit" an interpretation? Recognizing this opaqueness, analysts have generally assumed that the
real point of step two is found in other passages in the opinion, in
33
which the Court referred to step two as a test of reasonableness.
That term was at least familiar in the lexicon of judicial review, but it
34
was so elastic as to be little improvement.
The vagueness of the step two standard was troubling enough,
but more pertinent to my theme is the fact that the two-step test also
seemed to verge on internal incoherence. Under the structure of the
31. Criticisms of the two-step formula are still being voiced in some quarters, however. See,
e.g., Merrill, Executive Precedent, supra note 16, at 998-1003 (criticizing Chevron for its failure to
give weight to "traditional deference factors" such as the longevity, consistency, and thoughtfulness of an agency's interpretation); see also infra note 35 (discussing Judge Stephen Williams'
views).
32. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
33. See id. at 844, 845, 865, 866.
34. My favorite example of the ambiguity of "reasonableness" tests dates from the preChevron era, when the Court may have been less self-conscious about its terminology. In American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402 (1983), the Court used "reasonableness" in two different senses within a single opinion: first as the standard for determining
whether an agency rule was arbitrary and capricious, id. at 417-18, and then (on a different
substantive issue) as the standard for determining whether the agency's statutory interpretation
should be upheld, id. at 422-23. Surely, however, those two tests cannot be identical. If they
were, the distinction between law and policy would vanish. Although the Court's implicit equation between the two tests may reflect nothing more than careless draftsmanship, it is an apt
reminder that scope of review doctrine has traditionally encompassed a multitude of "reasonableness" tests that are not entirely consistent with each other.
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Chevron formula, a court should not reach step two unless it has already found during step one that the statute supports the govern-

ment's interpretation or at least is ambiguous with respect to it. In
other words, the agency's view is not clearly contrary to the meaning
of the statute. If the court has made such a finding, one would think
that the government's interpretation must be at least "reasonable" in
the court's eyes. Why, then, is the second step not superfluous? 35 Obviously, if it is to be meaningful, the step two inquiry has to involve
qualitativelydifferent considerations from those implicated during step

one. Yet the Court's opinion did not identify those considerations. In
this sense, Chevron left the very meaning of the second step ill-defined; further clarification was going to be necessary.
To date, however, the Supreme Court's subsequent case law has
offered little illumination on this score, because in the thirteen years
since Chevron, the Court has never once struck down an agency's interpretation by relying squarely on the second Chevron step.36 I base this
assertion primarily on my own reading, and it is hard to prove a nega-

tive, but I can cite one important bit of corroborating evidence: In his
careful analyses of cases between 1984 and 1993 in which the Court
reviewed an agency interpretation, Professor Merrill found seventeen
cases in which the government lost without the Court's relying on the

Chevron framework, fourteen in which the government lost at step
one, and none in which the government lost at step two. 37 As we have
seen, the Court has not proved to be much more deferential in the
post-Chevron era than it was before; but when it utilizes the Chevron
framework, it either upholds the agency or reverses on the strength of

step one. 38

35. Judge Stephen Williams has questioned the utility of dividing statutory interpretation
under Chevron into two discrete steps. See, e.g., Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Ore. v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995); Colloquy,
Developments in JudicialReview with Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the
Agency, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 113, 123-24 (1990) (remarks of the Hon. Stephen F. Williams) [hereinafter
Williams]. To a large extent I agree with the criticism, as will become apparent, but for now I
will start with the conventional understanding of Chevron and work towards refinements that
take the criticism into account. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
36. I may be the first commentator to try to extract significance from this interesting fact,
but I am not the first to have noticed it. See Belcaster, supra note 28, at 752 n.42.
37. See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 20, at 376-77; Merrill, Executive Precedent, supra
note 16, at 1034-41.
38. A possibly debatable case is Department of Treasury v. Federal Labor Relations Auth.,
494 U.S. 922 (1990) (Scalia, J.), in which the Court relied on Chevron and declared that an
agency interpretation was "not reasonable" because it was contrary to the plain meaning of the
statute. See id. at 928 ("The FLRA's position is flatly contradicted by the language of' the
statute and its arguments do not "overcome this plain text."). Plain meaning is, however, closely
identified with the first Chevron step; thus, I share Merrill's apparent assumption, see Merrill,
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Inevitably one is moved to wonder whether step two, as the
Court conceives of it, serves any useful purpose at all. In an opinion
that upholds an agency interpretation, perhaps the Court's finding
that the agency interpretation is "reasonable" serves a useful purpose

in legitimating the outcome. In effect, it provides a way for the Court
to certify that the agency's view is not only consistent with congressional intent, but also socially responsible. At some point, however,
litigants and lower court judges will look at the Court's actions as well

as its words. If the administrative law community comes to believe
that an agency that survives step one is home free, at least in the
Supreme Court, step two could lose any credibility it may once have
had.

In order to identify possible solutions to these conundrums, I will
examine a series of decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit. That

focus seems a natural one for several reasons. In the first place, the
D.C. Circuit is a tribunal that encounters administrative law issues

much more frequently than the Supreme Court does. 39 Moreover, as
noted earlier, that court has taken Chevron seriously from the beginning and relies on the two-step framework with great regularity. It

has thus become a "laboratory" in which we can observe a court trying to work out a meaningful role for step two. The circuit has, in fact,
invalidated agency actions on the basis of step two of Chevron on a

number of occasions, and the following discussion will give special emphasis to those cases.40 To date, the court has not settled on a single
approach to step two. Enough examples of several distinct approaches have emerged, however, to support a critical evaluation of
those approaches.

Executive Precedent,supra note 16, at 1035, that the Court was using the word "reasonable" in a
casual manner, without specific reference to the two-step framework. Even if one insists on
deeming Department of Treasury a step two reversal, its reliance on the interpretive techniques
of the first step would tend to confirm the proposition that the Court has not developed any
distinctive mode of analysis for applying the second step.
39. See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme
Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345, 371 ("As a practical matter, the D.C. Circuit is something of a
resident manager [in administrative law], and the Supreme Court an absentee landlord.").
40. This methodology reflects my belief that, in general, the best evidence about the meaning of a given standard of review comes from cases in which it is used to strike down an agency
action. Loose talk about deference is a pervasive problem in writing about scope of review, but
judicial reasoning that is used to explicate an actual holding can be evaluated against the relevant factual background and has a relatively strong claim to credibility.
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III.

STEP

Two As
A.

1263

ARBITRARINESS REVIEW

The Case Law

An important line of cases from the D.C. Circuit has implemented step two of the Chevron test through lines of argument that
originated in abuse of discretion doctrine, often under banners such as
"reasoned decisionmaking" or the judicial "hard look." The hard
look case law basically requires an agency to generate a "reasoned
analysis" supporting its exercises of discretion, "examin[ing] the relevant data and articulat[ing] a satisfactory explanation for its action. ' 41
In effect, the court has transformed the Chevron step two question of
whether the agency action was "reasonable" into a question of
whether it was "reasoned."
Perhaps the first of the court's cases to suggest this approach was
Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. ("PBGC"). 42 The plaintiffs
in Rettig were employees who had worked for their employer for decades without acquiring vested rights under their pension plan. After
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), which required vesting, the employer amended its plan
accordingly. Soon afterwards, the company went out of business, and
plaintiffs sought plan termination insurance benefits from the PBGC.
The agency denied their claims, relying on a section of ERISA that
allowed the agency to disregard any benefit increases attributable to a
plan amendment that had been adopted shortly before the plan
43
terminated.
The D.C. Circuit reversed. Although the court had the "strong
impression" that Congress had contemplated benefits for persons in
the plaintiffs' situation, it declined to hold that, for purposes of step
one of Chevron, Congress's intentions were unambiguous. 44 Thus, the
court reached step two. It argued that the basic purpose of the statutory exclusion was to prevent employers from "ballooning" their plans
with generous benefits at a time when they could foresee that their
plans would terminate, forcing the PBGC to bear the ultimate liability. Yet, the court explained, this fear of employer abuse was simply
not implicated by plan amendments that Congress itself had required
employers to adopt. 45 Quickly dismissing as flimsy several other pol41. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 57 (1983)
(citations omitted).
42. 744 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
43. See id. at 137-39.
44. See id. at 151.
45. See id. at 152.
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icy arguments offered by the agency, the court emphasized that the
plaintiffs' loss of pension benefits after many years of service was exactly the kind of problem that Congress had passed ERISA to
46
rectify.
In short, although the court invoked step two, its rationale actually amounted to a typical use of the hard look doctrine, and the court
described it as such: the PBGC's position did not "reflect the results of
a reasoned decisionmaking process calculated to accommodate the
conflicting policies underlying ERISA. ' '4 7 Writing less than three
months after Chevron, Judge Wald seemed more than a little uncertain about whether the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement had
been intended to displace the arbitrary and capricious standard of the
APA. "The possible difference in standards is not critical here, however," she continued, "because we do not believe the agency's rationale for the application of its rule to this set of facts would meet the
APA standard either, . . . and our analysis of the PBGC's action
under the arbitraryand capricious standardwould not differ in any ma'48
terial respect."
The suggestion in Rettig that Chevron step two and the arbitrary
and capricious test are similar to each other, if not identical, has continued to crop up in the D.C. Circuit's cases. 49 A more recent example is Athens Community Hospital, Inc. v. Shalala.5 0 The Medicare
Act permits the Secretary of Health and Human Services to redesignate a rural hospital as being in an urban area for the purpose of determining its reimbursement level. Under the Secretary's
implementing regulations, a hospital could be eligible for redesignation if it was located within thirty-five road miles of an urban area and
was in an adjacent county. Three hospitals that met the former criterion but not the latter challenged the rules, and the court agreed with
their challenge. The thirty-five-mile requirement (which the court had
already upheld in an earlier case) appeared sufficient to fulfill the objective of ensuring that an applicant competed for labor with urban
46. See id. at 152-55.
47. Id. at 135.
48. Id. at 151 n.46 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
49. See, e.g., General Am. Transp. Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 872 F.2d 1048,
1053 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that the two questions are "quite similar" and analyzing them as
one); AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This perception is not confined to
the D.C. Circuit. See New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 410 (2d Cir. 1989) (Winter, J.) ("We
need say little to dispose of appellants' contention that the regulations are arbitrary and capricious, as that test is functionally equivalent to the reasonableness test of Chevron."), affd sub
nom. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
50. 21 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

1997]

THE ANATOMY OF CHEVRON: STEP TWO RECONSIDERED

hospitals and thus deserved a high reimbursement rate. Accordingly,

the court reasoned, the additional requirement that the hospital be in
an adjacent county served no discernible purpose. 5 ' Although the
court stated that it was proceeding under Chevron step two, it relied
squarely on case law defining arbitrariness and, indeed, appeared to
52
regard these two rubrics as interchangeable.

These are not isolated examples. It is not hard to find other cases
in which the court has invalidated agency actions at step two of Chevron on the basis of lines of argument that seem much more like tradi-

tional rational basis review than like "statutory construction." For
example, the D.C. Circuit has used step two of Chevron to set aside
agency actions because they did not rest on a reasoned analysis 5354or
failed to give a good explanation for a departure from precedent.

In addition, one sometimes notices D.C. Circuit panels declaring
that they will not consider the validity of an argument that could potentially justify an agency action as reasonable under step two of
55

Chevron, because the agency must pass upon the argument first.

The principle that an agency action cannot be upheld except on
grounds adopted by the agency originated as a component of abuse of
discretion doctrine. 5 6 "The justification for this rule is that only the

agency has authority to make discretionary determinations that Con''5 7 The D.C. Circuit's extension of the princigress has delegated to it.
51. See id. at 1179-80.
52. See id. at 1179.
53. See Whitecliff, Inc. v. Shalala, 20 F.3d 488, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding under step two
that "the Secretary's indiscriminate equation of [two accounting concepts] is simply illogical,
without any economic or accounting support and therefore an unreasonable interpretation of
[the statute]"); LEECO, Inc. v. Hays, 965 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (reversing under step
two because of agency's failure to explain extension of precedent); Coal Employment Project v.
Dole, 889 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that mine safety rule, under which minor infractions would not be noted on employer's record, was unreasonable under step two because of
agency's unexplained failure to take into account Congress's desire to impose higher penalties
on repeat offenders).
54. See King Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 860 F.2d 465, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1988); cf. Hammontree
v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1499-1500 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en bane) (upholding order at step two
because, inter alia, it was consistent with prior Board precedent).
55. See Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 83 F.3d
1497, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82, 90,
93 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Acme Die Casting v. NLRB, 26 F.3d 162, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The NLRA
is ambiguous, so under Chevron we will be bound to accept any reasonable rule the Board
accepts as an appropriate gap-filling measure. But the Board must select the rule."); City of
Kansas City v. HUD, 923 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that reliance on a mere litigating
position of agency counsel would be unacceptable in arbitrariness review and thus should also be
unacceptable in Chevron step two review).
56. The principle is usually traced to SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). See generally Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative
Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199 (discussing the principle).
57. Levin, Restatement Report, supra note 16, at 261.
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pie to step two jurisprudence is a further indication that the court sees
its function under that step as being, at least to a significant extent,
equivalent to reviewing an exercise of administrative discretion.

I emphasize that these cases illustrate the circuit's approach to
Chevron step two through actual holdings, not just fleeting dicta about
what step two could potentially mean. Cases in which an agency actually loses at step two offer the most clear-cut illustrations of the

court's reasoning, but I am not making any claim about the frequency
of those cases. 58 To determine how often challengers succeed using

this line of argument, and thus how intrusively or deferentially the
court applies it, would require a careful empirical study, which Ihave

not undertaken. What these cases do illustrate is a mode of analysis
that at least is available when the court chooses to make use of it.
Commentators, too, have occasionally acknowledged, although
usually without extended analysis, the similarity between Chevron
step two and arbitrariness review. 59 To say the least, then, the convergence between these two modes of review is a significant theme in

contemporary judicial review, and its merits deserve serious attention.
B.

Evaluation

In evaluating the emerging convergence in the D.C. Circuit between Chevron step two and the hard look doctrine, one must immediately confront a conceptual problem. The convergence will
probably strike some readers as odd, because Chevron proclaims itself
to be a case about "construction of a statutory provision. '60 That
58. Of course, there are also numerous cases in which the court examines an agency's factual and policy analysis, deems it rational, and finds on that basis that the agency action passes
muster under step two. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 36166 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (endorsing potential EPA regulatory approach to disposal of hazardous
wastes as reasonable under step two on the basis of facts and policy reasoning); Chemical Waste
Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding under step two, as based on
a "reasonable explanation," informal procedures for adjudication of penalties for violation of
hazardous waste management regulations); Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic
Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding agency's relaxation of fuel
economy standards as reasonable accommodation of statutory policies).
59. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 725 (3d ed. 1992); Coverdale, supra note 2, at 45-46 n.66; Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretationand Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187,
200 (1992); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2104-05. A fuller treatment, reaching conclusions similar
to those advanced in this article, appears in KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 148-51 (3d ed. Supp. 1996). Although Professor
Seidenfeld believes that under current law step two is so deferential as to be almost inconsequential, see Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 96, he thinks it should be invigorated through an infusion of "hard look" methodology. Id. at 125-29.
60. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984).

1997]

THE ANATOMY OF CHEVRON: STEP TWO RECONSIDERED

phrase, to many minds, connotes a set of distinctively "legal" issues,
involving (for example) statutory language, legislative history, structure and purposes, and canons of construction, as distinguished from
the kind of inquiry a court makes when it is overseeing an exercise of
administrative discretion. On that assumption, a court should not
even reach the question of whether an agency action is arbitrary and
capricious until after the action has survived Chevron scrutiny.
A close reading of the Supreme Court's opinion suggests, however, that the Chevron test was not intended to deal only with statutory interpretation in that limited sense, and that the D.C. Circuit case
law is a valid response to certain significant overtones in that opinion.
Most telling of these overtones is the Court's explicit link between the
theme of judicial deference and the concept of congressional delegation of authority. Just after setting forth the two-step review formula,
the Court commented:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations
are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a61reasonable interpretation made by
the administrator of an agency.
As this quotation seems to recognize, courts have for many years
been accustomed to reviewing legislative regulations through a twostep process in which the judge would initially ask whether the agency
had stayed within the bounds of its delegated discretion (in Chevron's
terms, was the agency's view "manifestly contrary to the statute"?),
and then whether the agency had abused its discretion. One of Chevron's most important innovations was to extend this model to agencies' statutory interpretations generally. As Professor Henry
Monaghan had written the previous year, "[j]udicial deference to
agency 'interpretation' of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of law-making authority to an agency."' 62 The Court added a
61. Id. at 843-44 (footnotes omitted).
62. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26
(1983) (emphasis omitted). According to Professor Neuman, the Court apparently had
Monaghan's views in mind when it formulated the Chevron standard of review. See Gerald L.
Neuman, Law Review Articles That Backfire, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 697, 711-12 (1988).
Neuman notes that, although Chevron did not cite Monaghan's article, the sentence from his
article that I have quoted above had been quoted in an opinion by Justice White a few months
earlier. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 986 n.19 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Neuman, supra,
at 712. Actually, other commentators have also articulated models or theories of judicial review
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twist to the Monaghan theory by also exhorting judges to refrain from
finding (at step one) that the agency had acted outside its delegated
authority unless the statutory obstacle was "clear; ' 63 and much of the
subsequent controversy about Chevron has revolved around the ques-

tion of how "clear" a congressional mandate must be in order to meet
this test. That refinement aside, however, the Court's delegation
model strongly suggests that the second step of the Chevron formula

was intended to be a direct counterpart to the arbitrariness test that
courts had traditionally applied in their review of legislative rules.
Otherwise, one would have to assume that the Court contemplated a
sharp distinction between explicit and implicit delegations, which
hardly makes sense. 64

Continuing in the same vein, the Court observed that the "principle of deference to administrative interpretations" 65 requires a court
to avoid disturbing an agency's choice if it is "a reasonable accommo-

dation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care
by the statute ... unless it appears from the statute or its legislative
history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have

sanctioned.

'66

Surely this notion of "interpretation" is strongly linked

to the exercise of delegated authority.
The Court's discussion in Chevron of the actual EPA rule it was
reviewing also evinces a broad understanding of "interpretation." For

example, at one point the Court remarked, in support of the agency's
definition of "stationary source," that "the EPA has advanced a rea-

sonable explanation for its conclusion that the regulations serve the
environmental objectives [of the Clean Air Act]... [and] its reasoning
is supported by the public record developed in the rulemaking process
...
67 Thus the validity of the EPA's "interpretation" depended in

part on the quality of the agency's reasoning and the strength of the
that resemble Monaghan's. See, e.g., Clark Byse, JudicialReview of Administrative Interpretation
of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 262-65 (1988); Nathaniel L.
Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretationof Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470, 475
(1950). The most detailed of these analyses can be found in Levin, Identifying Questions of Law,
supra note *, at 16-46. (Although I would like to claim that my article influenced the Court as
much as Monaghan's did, that boast would be somewhat weakened by the fact that my article
did not appear in print until more than a year after the Court decided Chevron.)
63. See 467 U.S. at 842.
64. See Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 151 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (expressing doubt that the Court could have intended such a distinction).
65. 467 U.S. at 844.
66. Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
67. Id. at 863.
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evidence in the record. This and similar passages in the opinion 68 imply that the Court was not referring to "interpretation" in a manner
that envisioned a sharp distinction between law and policy. On the

contrary, the Court apparently assumed that an agency is "interpreting" not only when it decides in the abstract what the statute means,
but also when it applies that interpretation to a particular set of facts,
or when it exercises its discretion within the boundaries allowed by
the statute.
In short, Chevron apparently did think of "interpretation" in a

broad sense: an activity that would embrace not only determinations
that a court might scrutinize using traditional tools of statutory construction (which the Court said are available at step one 69), but also

determinations involving exercises of discretion (inferentially left for
judicial scrutiny at step two). Although there is nothing inherently
unworkable about the Court's concept of "interpretation," so long as
all players in the game understand the usage, 70 it is somewhat confusing. In particular, one inelegant aspect of this analytical framework is

that the Court did not pause to integrate it with the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review, which under the APA is applicable to
all agency actions. The D.C. Circuit case law summarized in the previ-

ous section can serve to rectify this omission. The circuit's emerging
understanding of step two as overlapping abuse of discretion review is
compatible with-if not indeed driven by-the Supreme Court's
opinion.
Incidentally, this exegesis of the Chevron opinion suggests a credible explanation for the intriguing fact that the Supreme Court has
never set aside an agency action on the basis of the second Chevron

step.71 Generally speaking, the Court grants certiorari in order to re-

68. See id. at 845 ("EPA's use of [the bubble] concept here is a reasonable policy choice for
the agency to make."); id. at 863 ("[T]he agency primarily responsible for administering this
important legislation has consistently interpreted it flexibly-not in a sterile textual vacuum, but
in the context of implementing policy decisions in a technical and complex arena."); id. at 866
("When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy ....
the challenge must fail.").
69. See id. at 843 n.9.
70. Cf. General Motors Corp. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 898 F.2d 165
(D.C. Cir. 1990). There the agency had stated its belief that "the correct interpretation of the
statute does not permit [retroactive] amendments [in fuel economy standards]." Id. at 171 (emphasis added by the court). The petitioners took this statement to mean that the agency had
erroneously believed that it was constrained by the statute and unable to exercise any policy
judgment. Had they been right, they would have had a solid ground for reversal. See infra note
148 and accompanying text. But the court, examining the passage in context, decided that the
agency could not have meant it that way. See 898 F.2d at 171-72.
71. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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solve relatively clear-cut legal issues; it leaves to the courts of appeals
the primary responsibility for overseeing the manner in which agencies apply legal principles to particular fact situations. 72 If, as I have

suggested, the second Chevron step is largely (if not entirely) coextensive with abuse of discretion review, one should expect the Court's

certiorari policies to be similar in those two contexts. Thus, just as the
Court rarely takes a case in order to hold that an agency action was

legally authorized but involved an abuse of discretion, the Court is
unlikely to take a case with the expectation of holding that an agency
action passes Chevron step one but flunks step two.73
Assuming that, for the reasons just summarized, we can get past
the conceptual difficulties posed by Chevron's tacit theory of "inter-

pretation," it is easy to see some of the advantages that the absorption
of arbitrariness themes into Chevron step two review has had for the
D.C. Circuit. Once the circuit had resolved to make consistent use of
Chevron as the focus of its review of the substance of agency actions,
it had to find a role for the second Chevron step that would set it apart

from the work of the first step. The use of abuse of discretion arguments at step two has alleviated the problem. Analysis under step one
of Chevron could proceed, as the Supreme Court had said it should,
from the "traditional tools of statutory construction. '74 Abuse of discretion review, on the other hand, could be used to assess the rational-

ity of an agency's exercise of discretion. 75 The court seems to be
headed towards a fairly tidy analytical structure, in which step one

asks whether the agency violated a clear mandate in the statute itself,
and step two asks whether the agency used acceptable reasoning to
get from the statute to its ultimate result.
72. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283, 306-10 (1974); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951).
Although the Court originally treated this principle as applying only to substantial evidence
review of agency fact findings, as in Universal Camera, the American Textile and Mobil Oil opinions demonstrate that the Court also applies it to situations that are better described as involving
exercises of administrative discretion.
73. This is not necessarily the only explanation for the absence of step two reversals in the
Supreme Court. Another explanation may lie in the simple fact that the Justices usually try to
avoid depicting themselves as lawmakers. Even when their reservations about the government's
position have more to do with its practical implications than with evidence about the legislature's
intent, they quite naturally look for a way to ascribe their position to Congress. Or perhaps I
should say that they try to persuade themselves that the flaw in the agency's view is outside
themselves-it is "in" the statute, or "in" legislative intent, or whatever else they decide to use as
a basis for statutory interpretation. The customary rhetoric of statutory interpretation thus creates a powerful incentive to rely where possible on step one rather than step two.
74. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
75. These two types of inquiry are not always separable, as I will discuss below, but they
differ often enough to belie the idea that the two Chevron steps are basically redundant.
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Moreover, the circuit already had available a rich body of reasoned decisionmaking precedents from which it could draw in giving
meaning to the second Chevron step. Those precedents are hardly
uncontroversial, but at least the judges of the circuit are familiar with
the usual criticisms. Sometimes they respond to critiques from the
agencies' side, sometimes to critiques from private interests, and
sometimes to neither, but they have all thought about the issues and
worked out accommodations that allow judicial business to be carried
on. This tradition has enabled them to give definition and shape to
their step two jurisprudence.
One might also speculate that the court sees the convergence of
Chevron step two and arbitrariness review as helping to legitimize its
reasoned decisionmaking precedents. The court has been able to say,
as it engages in hard look review, that it is simply carrying out the
responsibilities prescribed in the leading Supreme Court case on judicial review of the substance of agency actions.
C. Overlap or Equivalence?
Although the D.C. Circuit has often drawn upon the methods of
arbitrariness review in its elaboration of Chevron step two, it has
stopped short of actually calling them identical. Rather, it usually describes these two inquiries as "overlapping," adding that in some ways
they probably diverge. 76 I intend to suggest, however, that this insistence on a possible divergence is misdirected. To that end, I will examine Judge Kenneth Starr's opinion in Continental Air Lines, Inc. v.
Department of Transportation,77 the D.C. Circuit's most frequently
cited discussion of the "divergence."
The case grew out of legislation that was intended to protect the
economic viability of Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport ("DFW")
by restricting flights at a competing airport, Love Field. At a minimum, the statutory language limited Love Field traffic to flights within
the immediate geographical region, but it left room for argument as to
whether carriers such as Continental Air Lines, which also happened
to operate interstate routes from other airports, were eligible to provide such flights. The Department ruled that Continental was eligible
76. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Regulated Util. Comm'rs v. ICC, 41 F.3d 721, 726-27 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), discussed infra Part IV.C.; Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. United States
EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman, J., concurring); see also infra note 141
(discussing Judge Wald's analysis)
77. 843 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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to operate at Love Field. Continental's competitors at DFW, along
with the city of Dallas, appealed.
The court pronounced the statute ambiguous 78 and proceeded to
Chevron step two. The court defined the critical inquiry as "whether
the agency has advanced what the Chevron Court called 'a reasonable
explanation for its conclusion that the regulations serve
the ...objectives [in question].' 79 An agency action should survive
scrutiny under this standard even if the reviewing court were to doubt
that the action would "best promote" the policies or objectives of
Congress; a court should strike down an agency action under step two
only if the action "actually frustrated the policies that Congress was
seeking to effectuate. '80 The Department's interpretation was readily
acceptable under this standard, because "the purpose of the Love
Field Amendment was to limit that airport's operations to 'short-haul'
service. Permitting Continental to provide Love Field-Houston service was, obviously, entirely in keeping with that policy."8' 1
In the course of explaining this standard of review, the court
noted:
This, of course, sounds closely akin to plain vanilla arbitrary-andcapricious style review. But it should immediately be made clear
that interpreting a statute is quite a different enterprise than policymaking.... [M]uch of the "arbitrary and capricious" style analysis
concerned with reasoned agency decisionmaking... cannot be applied directly to the question of whether an agency's interpretation
of a statute is "contrary to law." It would be inappropriate, therefore, to import wholesale
that body of law and apply it in a concep82
tually distinct arena.
In the specific context of Continental Air Lines, Judge Starr's distinction was unconvincing. Since he had already decided that the statute was inconclusive on the issue under consideration, the thrust of his
argument was that the agency had done an acceptable job of reasoning from the statute. The general intent of Congress was to acquiesce
in short-haul flights at Love Field, and the Continental application
was compatible with that objective. He could easily have labeled his
argument a "reasoned decisionmaking" holding.83 In fact, he ac78. See id. at 1447-49.
79. Id. at 1452 (alteration in original) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863).
80. Id. at 1452-53.
81. Id. at 1453.
82. Id. at 1452.
83. Had Judge Starr concluded that the purposes of the amendment militated so strongly
towards allowing interstate carriers to operate short-haul flights at Love Field that Congress
must have intended that result, so that the Department of Transportation would have been powerless to decide otherwise, he would have been adopting a rationale that perhaps could only be
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knowledged as much when he noted that his analysis was virtually the
same as that of Rettig.84 The essence of hard look review is careful
examination of an agency's reasoning process, and the conclusions
that the agency has drawn in reasoning from the underlying statute
are certainly an important element of that examination. When Judge
Starr labeled the agency's view an "interpretation," he may not have
been misusing the English language, but his label did not change the
reality that he was, in essence, reviewing the agency's exercise of
discretion.
Indeed, from one perspective it is arguable that Judge Starr
should have relied on the phraseology of reasoned decisionmaking
case law, rather than the Chevron framework, in resolving the case.
As I have mentioned, he defined Chevron step two as an inquiry into
whether the agency's action "actually frustrated" congressional policy.
In articulating this test, he mused that it was susceptible of abuse, because courts might too freely invoke it to override agencies' discretionary choices. He also acknowledged, however, that judges
conducting arbitrariness review have long since come to terms with
that challenge: the judicially elaborated expectation of reasoned decisionmaking "over the years has come to mean a variety of well-known
factors. ' 85 He did not argue that courts never misapply the hard look
doctrine, but he did say that "[i]f carried out correctly, arbitrary-andcapricious style review does not put the court into the (agency's)
driver's seat."' 86 Inasmuch as he apparently believed that hard look
case law had already worked out, to the extent doctrinal formulas and
precedents can, the proper degree of deference, it is somewhat ironic
that he should have elected to try to cover the same ground with a
new and untested analytical framework, within which the proper degree of deference would be up for grabs.
I do not intend this exegesis to demonstrate that Judge Starr's
assumption of an unavoidable divergence between arbitrariness review and Chevron step two review was necessarily wrong, but only
that he did not make a persuasive case for it. And, regardless of
whether or not he was right, D.C. Circuit judges continue to voice the
described as statutory interpretation. Then one would have to ask whether that line of argument
should be regarded as arising under Chevron step one or step two. But it seems evident from the
Continental Air Lines opinion as a whole that Judge Starr did not see the legislation in those
terms.
84. 843 F.2d at 1452-53.
85. Id. at 1451.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
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same assumption.8 7 That view has, however, generated uncertainties
of its own. The uncertainties have perhaps never been more visible
than in Arent v. Shalala,88 a case in which the judges of the D.C. Circuit could not even agree among themselves about whether to treat a
challenger's contentions as an arbitrariness argument or a step two
argument.
The issue in Arent concerned Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") guidelines under which retail food stores were to furnish
consumers with nutrition information about raw produce and fish. A
statute provided that the guidelines were to remain voluntary unless
the FDA found that retailers were not in "substantial compliance"
with them. The petitioners challenged the FDA's position that, in this
context, the "substantial compliance" test would be satisfied if sixty
percent of retail food stores followed the guidelines.
In his majority opinion, Chief Judge Edwards declared that,
although the petitioners had framed their argument under Chevron,
their analysis was misdirected. "Chevron is principally concerned with
whether an agency has authority under a statute," he wrote, and in
this case "there is no question that the FDA had authority to define
the circumstances constituting food retailers' substantial compliance." 89 Thus, he continued, "[t]he only issue here is whether the
FDA's discharge of that authority was reasonable," an issue that "falls
within the province of traditional arbitrary and capricious review." 90
In a concurring opinion, Judge Wald faulted the majority for secondguessing the parties' choice of how to present their case. 9 1 She
thought the case should be resolved by asking "whether the agency's
interpretation is reasonable and consistent with Congress' purpose in
enacting the [underlying statute]." 92 She believed that this inquiry
was "well within the bounds of typical Chevron step two analysis. ' 93
Both judges, however, acknowledged an "overlap" between Chevron
and arbitrariness review, despite their inability to agree on where to
94
draw the line.
Public wrangling about this somewhat abstruse issue is uncommon, and the question of which label was preferable in Arent is not
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
70 F.3d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Id. at 615-16.
Id. at 616.
See id. at 619 (Wald, J., concurring).
Id. at 620.
Id.
See id. at 615, 616 n.6 (Edwards, C.J.); id. at 620 (Wald, J., concurring).
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important to my analysis at this point. 95 Nevertheless, the disagreement in Arent between these two highly experienced judges is cer-

tainly striking. One might have expected that, after a dozen years of
living with Chevron, a fundamental question like this would already
have been resolved. Nothing about the issues in Arent was unusual;
the disagreement between Chief Judge Edwards and Judge Wald

might just as easily have surfaced in any of a hundred other cases instead. Arent aptly highlights the puzzlement besetting the circuit's
judges and litigants regarding the relative roles of Chevron step two

and arbitrariness review. 96 Further evidence of confusion on the subject can be found in other opinions in which a panel has declared,
without much elaboration, that an issue that a challenger has framed
as a Chevron step two claim is really an arbitrariness claim, 97 or vice

versa. 98 Usually the panels simply declare the issue to be one or the
other, neither explaining their choice nor acknowledging that in similar circumstances other panels have made the opposite choice.

95. For a case like Arent, in which the petitioners had no evident step one argument, I
personally prefer the arbitrariness terminology because the case law under that rubric is more
fully developed and provides clearer guidance than the Chevron step two case law does. Moreover, although Judge Wald's cautionary message about respecting the parties' own choice of
analytical frameworks is generally good advice, it has less force when the confusion among litigants is largely attributable to the court's own confusing precedents (in this instance, precedents
that posit what I regard as an unnecessary and unwieldy distinction between Chevron step two
and arbitrariness). Nevertheless, my preference is mainly a matter of taste. I agree with Judge
Wald's statement that if Arent could not be deemed to fall within step two, neither could numerous other cases that the court has decided using that terminology. See id. at 620 (Wald, J.,
concurring).
Incidentally, if a distinction between Chevron step two and arbitrariness review is indeed to
be drawn, neither of the opinions in Arent offered a satisfactory account of how to draw it.
When they undertook to explain the kind of case that might fall within Chevron but not arbitrariness review, each used language suggesting that they were thinking primarily about the first step
in the Chevron analysis. See id. at 615 (Edwards, C.J.) ("[A] reviewing court's inquiry under
Chevron is rooted in statutory analysis and is focused on discerning the boundaries of Congress'
delegation of authority to the agency .... "); id. at 620 (Wald, J., concurring) ("[W]e might
invalidate an agency's decision under Chevron as inconsistent with its statutory mandate, even
though we do not believe the decision reflects an arbitrary policy choice[, if we] determine that
Congress has selected a different-albeit, in our eyes, less propitious-path [than the
agency's].").
96. At least one district judge in the circuit found Chief Judge Edwards' opinion deeply
baffling. See Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Robert C. Byrd Conference on the Administrative
Process, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 251, 261 (1996) (remarks of the Hon. Royce Lamberth) (asserting that the majority opinion "has thrown a monkey wrench in the Chevron deference analysis"
and "basically said we do not think much of Chevron deference," leaving him to "struggle with
whether to follow what I think is the correct statement of law in Judge Wald's concurrence, or
the panel opinion").
97. See Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Election Comm'n, 76 F.3d 1234, 1235-36 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
98. See Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United States EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
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My view is that both Chief Judge Edwards and Judge Wald were
right-except in arguing that the other was wrong. For they were debating an artificial question. In the remainder of this article I will suggest that the D.C. Circuit's strenuous efforts to divide up the terrain
between arbitrariness review and Chevron step two should be abandoned; the court, as well as other courts, would do better simply to
treat these two modes of analysis as equivalent. 99 I will maintain that
step one review and arbitrariness review, properly defined, can cover
all the types of inquiries that courts actually use step two to address.
The effort to find some middle step that falls within neither of the
former two types of review is not only unnecessary, but actually undesirable because it defines the scope of those two inquiries in an unjustifiably narrow fashion.
All this will take some careful explication in the next part of this
article, but the reader should note from the outset that, if I am right,
there would be definite benefits to declaring that the two standards
are equivalent. A conspicuous advantage of such a declaration is that
it would tend to simplify scope of review doctrine. Judges would be
able to think about review of the merits as a two-step process instead
of a three-step process. Today one often sees judicial decisions in
which a court works its way through two Chevron steps and then
through review for abuse of discretion, usually with no discernible theory for classifying arguments as being one or the other. 100 If step two
and arbitrariness were equated, the courts could ask themselves the
same sorts of questions about a given agency action as before, 10 1 but
they would be able to use a more compact analytical framework. Litigants, in turn, would have an easier time briefing cases, because they
would have fewer conceptual categories to try to keep straight.
A little over a decade ago, in Association of Data ProcessingService Organizationsv. Board of Governors,10 2 the D.C. Circuit accom99. As mentioned earlier, I acknowledge one exception to this generalization: In those appeals in which the court uses an arbitrariness standard to evaluate the purely factual findings of
an agency, it performs a function that probably cannot be identified with Chevron step two. See
supra note 7.
100. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990); Hazardous
Waste Treatment Council, Inc. v. United States EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 361-66 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Orloski v. Federal Election Comm'n, 795 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
101. As I remarked in the introduction to this article, I am not ignoring the many policybased critiques of hard look review in the literature, nor intimating that they have no merit.
Rather, my position is that any relaxation in the application of the hard look standard would not
undercut the case for equating step two with arbitrariness review. If anything, simplification of
scope of review doctrine may facilitate resolution of that controversy by pruning away unnecessary verbiage and thereby making the policy issues stand out more sharply.
102. 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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plished an analogous simplification of judicial review doctrine by
declaring that an agency needs the same amount of factual evidence to
satisfy the substantial evidence test, on the one hand, and the abuse of
discretion test, on the other. This was a welcome development, because, although the case law had been full of casual statements that
the substantial evidence test is a more rigorous standard, that distinction no longer had a sound policy foundation. 10 3 Thanks to thenJudge Scalia's opinion in Data Processing, litigants and judges in the
D.C. Circuit no longer have an incentive to debate each other over
which standard to apply, and they can freely cite precedents from substantial evidence cases during disputes governed by the arbitrariness
test, and vice versa. 10 4 Some circuits continue to endorse the obsolete
distinction rejected in Data Processing,10 5 but courts that have abandoned that distinction have made their case law on standards of review a little less complicated and difficult, without any real change in
the underlying relationship between court and agency. The equation
between Chevron step two and abuse of discretion review could serve
a very similar function.
All of this assumes, however, that a Chevron step two inquiry
contributes nothing to judicial review that arbitrariness review does
not already provide (and that also cannot be provided by Chevron
step one review). To test this proposition, I will examine in the next
part some of the case law's efforts to define such a role.
IV.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO STEP

Two

At the center of this article is the question of why the Chevron
test has two steps: why is the second one not redundant? The previous part analyzed a body of case law that has answered this question
by associating the second step with arbitrariness review. In this part
we shall examine cases in which other D.C. Circuit panels have offered alternative-but to my mind less satisfactory-answers. I will
argue that some of these alternative approaches are potentially misleading; at best, none of them is needed if review under Chevron step
one and arbitrariness review are properly defined. Again I will focus
primarily on cases in which an agency has lost at step two, because
103. See Levin, Restatement Report, supra note 16, at 272.
104. See also Midtec Paper Corp. v. United States, 857 F.2d 1487, 1496-98 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(following Data Processing and holding more generally that scope of review principles are
roughly the same for adjudication and rulemaking).
105. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 1992); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.13 (5th Cir. 1991).
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they provide the most vivid and revealing illustrations of the operation of step two reasoning of any given kind.
A.

Bifurcated Statutory Construction

One approach, which differs markedly from the conception of
step two explored in the previous section, but which can claim at least
a modicum of case law support, contemplates that reviewing courts
should apply the two-step test of Chevron by dividing up the terrain of
statutory interpretation into textual and nontextual components. That
is, a court should use step one to decide whether the text of the
agency's governing statute nullifies the agency's position; if it does
not, the court should proceed to step two and inquire whether other
conventional tools of construction cast doubt on the agency's position.
Over the years, a handful of cases from the Supreme Court 10 6 and the
D.C. Circuit 10 7 have seemed to endorse this approach.
Perhaps the clearest illustration of how an agency might lose at
step two under this approach is Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v.
United States Department of Interior.108 The Interior Department issued rules regarding the damages it could collect, in its capacity as

public trustee, from persons who had injured natural resources or
caused oil spills. Under the statute, the limitations period applicable
to such damage claims ran from the date when Interior's rules were

"promulgated."' 1 9 The D.C. Circuit thought this term was ambiguous:

it could mean the date when the rules were initially announced, or it
could mean-as the agency argued-the date on which the rules be-

came finalized after all judicial review and post-remand proceedings
were complete." 0 That ambiguity was enough to get the agency past

step one, because "[o]ur concern at this stage in our analysis is
106. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 (1992)
(suggesting that courts should look to the "plain language of the statute" at step one and "the
structure and language of the statute as a whole" at step two); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281, 292 (1988) ("If the agency regulation is not in conflict with the plain language of the
statute, a reviewing court must give deference .... "); Merrill, Textualism, supra note 20, at 35758 (noting this implication in the cases just cited).
107. See Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that, in the paradigmatic
Chevron case, "the question for the reviewing court is whether the agency's construction of the
statute is faithful to its plain meaning, or, if the statute has no plain meaning, whether the
agency's interpretaition is 'based on a permissible construction of the statute"'); Ball, Ball &
Brosamer, Inc. v. Reich, 24 F.3d 1447, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (defining step one as "looking to the
'statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole,"' while
step two requires "assess[ing] whether the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable in light of the
'language, legislative history, and policies of the statute').
108. 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
109. See id. at 1209.
110. See id. at 1210-11.
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whether the statutory text is precise."1 1' 1 Nevertheless, Interior's defi-

nition failed step two: it was "not a reasonable interpretation of the
statute, viewed with an eye to its structure and purposes, 11 12 because
it would enable the department to prolong industry's exposure to

damage claims indefinitely.
What makes Kennecott and similar cases interesting is that they
seem to conceive of Chevron as a case about "statutory interpreta-

tion" in the most conventional sense-i.e., as involving the sort of analytical techniques a court would use if it were reading a statute in a

non-administrative context. Many administrative lawyers probably
think of Chevron as being about statutory interpretation in that sense.

Kennecott illustrates how a court can recognize two discrete steps in
the judicial role even within the confines of that conception of "interpretation." It is easy to see how, under these assumptions, Chevron
could be understood as a two-step test that still leaves room for a separate and subsequent inquiry into whether the agency action was arbitrary and capricious.

To date, the bifurcated approach to statutory construction epitomized by Kennecott is decidedly a minority view. Arguably, it contradicts some of the language of the Chevron opinion itself, which

seemed to assert that all "traditional tools of statutory construction"
are available at step one. 11 3 More importantly, post-Chevron cases
have often set aside agency interpretations by drawing upon the full

range of conventional statutory construction techniques at step one.
Arguments from statutory structure and purpose, as well as legislative

history (among judges who are willing to consult it), are regularly examined at that step.1 14 So are canons of construction.

15

In fact, there

111. Id. at 1211.
112. Id. at 1213.
113. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
114. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992) (rejecting agency's
interpretation on the basis of structure and purpose arguments); Dole v. United Steelworkers,
494 U.S. 26 (1990) (same); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990) (same); City of Cleveland v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 68 F.3d 1361, 1366 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1995); American
Scholastic TV Programming Found. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1173, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Alabama Power
Co. v. United States EPA, 40 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1994); LaRouche v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 996 F.2d 1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
115. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988) (rejecting agency's interpretation on basis of constitutional
avoidance canon); Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Election Comm'n, 69 F.3d 600, 605 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (same); Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same).
This is not to say that canons of construction will always suffice to create the kind of "clear"
statutory meaning needed to overcome the agency's interpretation at step one. See, e.g., Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1991) (according deference under Chevron despite First Amend-
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is room to wonder whether the court in Kennecott really gave much
116
consideration to the implications of its version of the two-step test.
Inasmuch as inconsistency in approaches to scope of review doctrine is a familiar and perhaps ineradicable feature of modern judicial
review, Kennecott's minority status might not, in itself, be a strong
charge against it. More decisive, however, is the difficulty of identifying a persuasive normative justification for dividing the process of
statutory interpretation into two distinct steps in this manner.
The past decade, of course, has seen the blossoming of wide-ranging debates over statutory construction methods, and those debates
are not going to be settled any time soon. There is, however, no evident reason why the Chevron doctrine should incorporate any particular position in this controversy. Indeed, if it is to be successfully
"domesticated," the Chevron test should remain usable by judges on
all sides of the controversy. The obvious solution is to define the operative test at step one as a question of whether the court finds that
the agency's interpretation violates the clear meaning of a statute.
Judges can then continue to debate each other about the best way to
determine what meaning a statute "clearly" possesses, drawing upon
the same principles as they would use in any other statutory construction controversy. It is hard to see why these "traditional tools" should
not be consolidated into a single "step" in administrative law cases,
just as they are in other cases.
B.

Belatedly Discovered Clear Meaning

In another type of case in which the D.C. Circuit sometimes rules
against an agency at step two, the court's reasoning proceeds according to the following pattern: Initially, the court finds that the parties
have framed for decision a narrow legal issue that the controlling statute does not specifically answer. In light of this ambiguity, the court
declares that the agency has passed Chevron step one. Then the court
moves to step two and concludes, using the conventional tools of statment issues raised by agency's interpretation); Greenberg, supra note 30 (arguing that Chevron
deference should overcome lenity canon when agency construes regulatory statute that can be
enforced criminally). My point is simply that the decision about whether a canon creates the
requisite clarity can and should be made as part of the step one inquiry, instead of being postponed until later in the court's decisionmaking process.
116. See Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(stating, four days before Kennecott, that all traditional tools may be considered at step one);
Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding, in an earlier
appeal from the same rulemaking proceedings reviewed in Kennecott, that all traditional tools of
construction are pertinent to determining whether Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue).
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utory construction, that one of the premises of the agency's argument
cannot be reconciled with the underlying statute. Therefore the
agency loses. The question I discuss in this section is whether this
paradigm demonstrates a role for step two that cannot be performed
equally well by either Chevron step one review or abuse of discretion
review.
Cases in this category tend to be complicated. Therefore,
although the model just described sometimes forms the basis for actual holdings in some D.C. Circuit opinions,1 1 7 I will use a concurring
opinion to illustrate it, because the details of the case provide a relatively simple illustration of the type of reasoning I am describing.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ("NRDC") v.
Reilly,1 1 8 the EPA promulgated rules in 1989 to control emissions of
radionuclides (radioactive particles) from facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"), but it issued a series of stays
that prevented the rules from going into effect. The NRDC brought
suit, contending that the agency's authority to continue issuing such
stays had run out. Statutory deadlines predating the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 supported the NRDC's position.1 1 9 The EPA's
defense was based on § 112(d)(9) of the 1990 legislation, which stated
that the agency could refrain from issuing a radionuclides standard to
govern NRC-regulated facilities if it determined, after rulemaking
proceedings, that NRC regulations governing those facilities provided
"an ample margin of safety" to protect the public health. The EPA
contended that subsection (d)(9) impliedly permitted it to postpone
the effectiveness of its radionuclides standard pending further
study.120 Speaking through Judge Buckley, the court disagreed, holding that a separate provision of § 112-subsection (q)(1)-required
the court to enforce the agency's preexisting duty to allow the stan121
dard to go into effect.
Judge Silberman, concurring, developed a more complex argument for rejecting the EPA's position. In his view, subsection (q)(1)
was ambiguous and might possibly authorize the EPA to stay its radionuclides rule under subsection (d)(9). 122 For Judge Silberman, the
117. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
118. 976 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
119. See id. at 41.
120. See id. at 40.
121. See id. at 41.
122. See id. at 43 (Silberman, J., concurring). More specifically, subsection (q)(1) provided
that already-promulgated rules must go into effect "unless modified as provided in this section
.... According to Judge Silberman, the only provision of section 112 that could possibly be

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1253

ambiguity in the relationship between the two clauses precluded reversal of the EPA under Chevron step one. 123 Nevertheless, he argued, the EPA's interpretation was "unreasonable" for purposes of
Chevron step two, because, even if the agency could rely on subsec-

tion (d)(9) to stay already-promulgated rules, the structure of that
subsection indicated that the agency must conduct a rulemaking proceeding and make the "ample margin of safety" determination. The
provision could not be construed to allow the EPA to delay the effec124
tive date of its standard without taking those steps.

What I find noteworthy about Judge Silberman's rationale is that
he could easily have written it as an application of the first step of the
Chevron formula. Had he chosen to use step one terminology, Judge
Silberman could have said that, although § 112(d)(9) was ambiguous

in some respects, 125 its language and structure did show that "the intent of Congress [was] clear"126 on at least one point: the EPA could
not continue suspending its radionuclides standard without following
the procedures of that subsection.
The Silberman opinion in the radionuclides case is representative
of a substantial line of D.C. Circuit authority in which the court has

assumed, at least tacitly, that an agency action should survive step one
because Congress had not expressed a clear position on the narrow
issue that the parties had framed for decision. Usually this assumption leads to affirmance of the agency's action. 127 Occasionally, however, it leads to the same outcome as in Judge Silberman's NRDC v.
Reilly concurrence: the court reaches Chevron step two and rejects the

agency's position using statutory construction methods that are essentially the same as the techniques usually associated with Chevron step
one. 28 Because of their resemblance to step one reversals, I refer to
used to "modif[y]" the radionuclides standard for purposes of subsection (q)(1) was subsection
(d)(9). Yet, he continued, the latter provision did not overtly deal with stays of already-promulgated rules; rather, the discretion that it appeared to give the EPA was discretion not to promulgate rules. See id.
123. See id. at 41.
124. See id. at 44.
125. That is, Judge Silberman, unlike Judge Buckley, was willing to assume that the statute
would have allowed EPA to continue suspending the standard if the agency had followed the
subsection (d)(9) procedures. See id.
126. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
127. See, e.g., Central States Motor Freight Bureau, Inc. v. ICC, 924 F.2d 1099, 1104 (D.C.
Cir. 1991); Capitol Technical Servs., Inc. v. FAA, 791 F.2d 964, 970-71 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
128. See Abbott Lab. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Associated Gas Distrib. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1250, 1261-63 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Northern Natural
Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 827 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc). The
complex facts of these cases resist easy summary. Professor Seidenfeld, however, has subjected
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cases in this category of step two reversals as instances of "belatedly
discovered clear meaning."
My contention here is that Chevron step one review is an entirely
appropriate medium for arriving at results like those in the line of
cases just described. Step one should be defined to encompass all contentions that a court seeks to resolve using the "traditional tools of
statutory construction." At first glance, the Chevron opinion may
seem to indicate otherwise, because it declares that the court should
initially focus its attention on whether Congress has "directly addressed the precise question at issue. ' 129 That language, however,

gives reviewing courts quite a bit of latitude in determining what the
"precise question" in a given case really is. "Precise questions" are
not self-defining; they stem from the parties' contentions, as well as
the judge's own attempts to separate matters that the statute leaves
open from matters that the statute definitively resolves. Thus, for example, if an opinion writer frames the "precise question at issue" as
being whether Congress has clearly ruled out an option the agency has
chosen, or a premise on which the agency has sought to act, the stage

may be set for reversal at step one. 130 There is in fact considerable
case law in which the Supreme Court or the D.C. Circuit has overturned an agency's interpretation by imaginatively defining the "pre13
cise question at issue" in this fashion. '
Northern Natural to an extended (and unsympathetic) critique. See Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at
121-24. Most pertinently to the present discussion, he notes: "The manner in which the court
relied on the general architecture of the Act to find FERC's action unlawful corresponds to the
manner in which other courts have found clarity in otherwise ambiguous statutes at step one of
Chevron." Id. at 121.
129. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
130. See Williams, supra note 35, at 124-26; cf Monaghan, supra note 62, at 27:
The court's task is to fix the boundaries of delegated authority, an inquiry that includes
defining the range of permissible criteria. In such an empowering arrangement, responsibility is shared between court and agency; the judicial role is to specify what the
statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but not all of what it does mean.
131. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., 511 U.S. 328, 339 (1994)
(EPA's interpretation "goes beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity § 3001(i) contains."); Department of Treas. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922 (1990); Pittston Coal Group v.
Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988) (holding that black lung disease statute was somewhat
openended but nevertheless "simply will not bear the meaning the Secretary has adopted"); INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that statutory term "well-founded fear of persecution" was somewhat ambiguous but that Congress had impliedly forbidden the particular
interpretation chosen by INS); Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 442-43
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that, although "Congress delegated to [the agency] a considerable
measure of discretion in formulating a standard [for assessing damages from persons responsible
for environmental mishaps]," nevertheless the agency's view must be reversed under Chevron
step one because "the precise question here is a far more discrete one: whether DOI is entitled
to treat use value and restoration cost as having equal presumptive legitimacy as a measure of
damages").
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As a theoretical matter, much can be said for treating all contentions regarding an allegedly clear legislative mandate as part of a single statutory construction inquiry. In each situation the judge will be

relying on "traditional tools of statutory construction." That the issue
has to be framed in a somewhat more subtle manner when the alleg-

edly "clear" mandate relates to the agency's premises rather than its
ultimate result does not fundamentally alter the nature of the court's
task. 132 Nor is it evident why the quantum of deference accorded to
the agency's views should depend on whether the allegedly "clear"
congressional mandate pertains to the agency's premises, as opposed

to the agency's result. In practice, the deference that courts display in
these two situations seems to be about the same. The judges in the
"belatedly discovered clear meaning" cases have phrased their hold-

ings in step two 133
terminology (declaring that the agency's view was
"unreasonable"),

but their decisions disclose no solid indication

that their scrutiny is less intensive by virtue of their proceeding under
step two rather than step one. 134 In short, so long as the issue at hand

is whether an element of the agency's argument conflicts in some way
with the unambiguous intentions of the legislature, the court's inquiry
should not be fragmented into two discrete steps. It should be resolved in a unified fashion at step one.
Admittedly, the model of judicial review that I have been developing here might be thought to draw lines that are too inflexible for
the workaday world of judging. Practically minded judges might say
to themselves that, even if Chevron step one is theoretically the right
framework for resolution of all statutory issues that involve the "tradi-

tional tools of statutory construction," they would not want to forego
the option of addressing those issues under step two instead. Such
reluctance would be easy to understand. Because the Chevron two132. See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[Complexity] alone is insufficient to invoke Chevron deference. Deference is appropriate
where the relevant language, carefully considered, can yield more than one reasonable interpretation, not where discerning the only possible interpretation requires a taxing inquiry.").
133. See NRDC v. Reilly, 976 F.2d 36, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silberman, J.,concurring); Abbott Lab. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 827 F.2d 779, 784 & n.7, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
134. For example, the dissent in Northern Natural,see 827 F.2d at 796-99 (Wald, J., dissenting), as well as Professor Seidenfeld, see Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 121-24, have offered seemingly powerful arguments that the court overreached in reversing the FERC in that case.
Lacking a sufficient background in natural gas regulation, I am not going to evaluate these critiques here. The Northern Natural opinion does not, however, read as though the court analyzed
the "reasonableness" of FERC's interpretation with any greater degree of deference than one
would have expected if the court had defined the issue as ascertaining whether Congress had a
"clear intent" about the acceptability of FERC's conduct.
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step test is so widely regarded as a controlling standard of review
these days, judges often feel that the demands of craftsmanship impel
them to divide their analysis into a step one segment and a step two
segment. Yet the arguments that judges wish to address in a given
case will not always divide neatly into statutory and nonstatutory categories. 135 An easy way in which a court might deal with that dilemma
would be to skip quickly past step one (remarking that the statute is
"unclear") and then resolve the main controversy in the case by canvassing a (possibly somewhat disorganized) combination of statutory
and nonstatutory arguments at step two.1 36 The option of keeping the
boundaries of step two flexible may seem particularly attractive to
judges in the regional circuits and district courts, who normally spend
much less time pondering scope of review issues in administrative law
137
than the judges of the D.C. Circuit do.
As one who has done a great deal of writing about scope of review, I freely acknowledge the elusiveness of the subject, and I try not
to expect everyone to share my zeal for doctrinal precision and consistency. 138 But a healthy measure of tolerance for slippage or even sloppiness in judicial opinion writing does not undermine the argument
that I have been developing. Remember, I am not claiming that Chevron step two should be consigned to oblivion. Rather, my claim is that
step two should be regarded as equivalent to arbitrariness review, because that mode of review, taken together with Chevron step one, can
accommodate all the lines of analysis that courts have been pursuing
under Chevron step two. In this particular context, the commingling
of issues that the judge described in the preceding paragraph may desire can be achieved within the rubric of arbitrariness review.
The reason is that arbitrariness review in administrative law has
always overlapped statutory construction to some extent. Issues that,
analytically speaking, might be better seen as questions of law (deter135. Alternatively, a court might wish to remain deliberately vague about the extent to which
its opinion rests on statutory compulsion. This impulse might spring from a laudable hesitation
to decide too much at once about the statute's reach.
136. A more rigorous, and probably preferable, alternative to that approach is to argue that
scrutiny at step one narrows the range of possibilities available under the statute, and that,
within the confines of that range, the agency's actual choice was "unreasonable" (in the arbitrariness sense) under step two. See Massachusetts v. United States Dept. of Transp., 93 F.3d 890,
892-93 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
137. Of course, the conceptual problems are just as daunting, if not more so, for litigants who
may have only a passing familiarity with Chevron but must write briefs applying its framework.
138. See Ronald M. Levin, Judicial Review and the Uncertain Appeal of Certaintyon Appeal,
44 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1086 (1995) (suggesting that inconsistencies in scope of review doctrine are
attributable in part to tendency of judges in any given case to focus primarily on substantive
issues).
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mining how much authority an agency had) are allowed to shade into
questions of discretion (determining whether the agency misused its

authority). Some of our leading precedents defining abuse of discretion review confirm this overlap: Under Overton Park abuse of discre-

tion review asks in part whether the agency considered the "relevant
factors,"'1 39 and under State Farm one consideration bearing on
whether a rule is arbitrary and capricious is whether the agency "has
'140
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider.

From a purist's point of view, step one might be the better vehicle for
such issues, but if a court is disposed not to use that category, abuse of
discretion review is a time-honored alternative. One can call the latter alternative "Chevron step two," but no actual departure from
traditional arbitrariness analysis is required.

In short, a court has two alternative doctrinal frameworks with
which it can justifiably evaluate the kind of issue that has led to reversal in a "belated discovered clear meaning" situation. The notion that
in this type of case Chevron step two serves a function that would
14 1
otherwise go neglected is, therefore, doubly erroneous.
139. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
140. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
141. In a recent article, Judge Wald has suggested three reasons for continuing to distinguish
Chevron step two from arbitrariness review: (1) "Arbitrary and capricious review focuses on an
agency's decisionmaking processes and explanations. Chevron, on the other hand, focuses on
statutory language, structure and purpose." (2) Collapsing Chevron step two into arbitrariness
review would improperly augment the courts' power, because it would be "no longer enough for
an agency to select one of several permissible statutory interpretations, rather the agency must
justify its selection of one particular permissible interpretation." (3) "Similarly, requiring agency
interpretations to consider all relevant factors could mean that agencies must take account of
vague expressions of congressional intent, thereby releasing Congress from Chevron's mandate
that it must speak clearly." Wald, supra note 28, at 244.
I agree in concept with the first point, but in my view the contrast Judge Wald wants to draw
is better seen as a distinction between Chevron step one and arbitrariness review. See supra
notes 129-134 and accompanying text. The second point is a puzzler, because under current
doctrine I believe a court normally would expect an agency to explain why it chose one of several statutory interpretations that are available because of congressional ambiguity, and I am
surprised that Judge Wald does not think so, too. Chevron teaches that a court should not impose its own preference among competing readings of an ambiguous statute, but asking for a
reasoned explanation of the agency's choice is precisely what step two is about. Besides, if, as
standard reasoned decisionmaking doctrine teaches, a court can expect an agency to justify its
choices among policy options, it would be odd not to impose the same expectation with respect
to choices the agency makes among readings of a statute. Cf Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 397 (1986) (questioning the rationality of a
judicial review system in which courts are more deferential on matters of law than on matters of
policy).
My reply to Judge Wald's third point is similar: a reasoned response to congressional mixed
signals is indeed part of the obligation that courts regularly impose on agencies at step two. See,
e.g., Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Wald, J.). Yet, because that response may take a form that the legislature would not have preferred, Congress still
has an incentive to "speak clearly."
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C.

Erroneously Perceived Legal Obstacle

A variation on the category of step two reversals examined in the
preceding section is a line of cases in which the court has remanded an
administrative action because the agency mistakenly believed itself
constrained by its governing statute. A useful case for scrutiny of this
model is National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) v. ICC.142 The NARUC case concerned a congressionally
mandated plan for "single-state registration" of vehicles operated by
interstate motor carriers. Under that system, each carrier would register with a single state, which would charge a fee for each registered
vehicle and then divide up the money with other states participating in
the system. The state would also issue receipts showing that these fees
had been paid. The statute required that "copies of the receipt ... be
kept in each of the carrier's commercial motor vehicles. ' 143 The
ICC's implementing regulations provided that the carrier would be
responsible for making copies of the receipt for each of its vehicles.
State regulatory authorities challenged this aspect of the regulations,
arguing that the Commission should instead have mandated that the
states themselves should furnish the copies. Such a system, they argued, would protect their revenue interests: officials would be able to
use roadside enforcement action to check for state-issued copies and
thereby assure themselves that the carriers had paid the requisite fees.
The D.C. Circuit, speaking through Judge Silberman, set aside
the ICC rules for two reasons. First, the Commission had refused the
states' request with the observation that such a scheme would impermissibly draw the agency into assisting with state enforcement efforts. 144 But the court rejected, as "incorrect statutory
interpretation," the idea that Congress had forbidden such assistance:
"Nothing in the language of the statute or in the legislative history
supports that extraordinary statement. To the contrary, we think that
Congress' requirement that copies of the state-issued receipts be carried in each vehicle can reasonably be understood only as intended to
aid state roadside enforcement.' 1 45 Second, the ICC had suggested
that the states could enforce their laws by auditing carrier records in142. 41 F.3d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The extended analysis of this case in Lawson, supra note
4, at 332-43, was the inspiration for my treatment of it here, although my conclusions differ from
his.
143. 49 U.S.C. § 11506(c)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
144. See 41 F.3d at 727. Professor Lawson questions whether the agency actually made this
claim, see Lawson, supra note 4, at 340 n.100, but for present purposes I assume with the court
that it did.
145. 41 F.3d at 728.
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stead. The court could not understand how that "quixotic" alternative
"could possibly substitute, under any plausible cost/benefit analysis,
for the traditional-and congressionally approved-method of roadside enforcement. '146 Nor did the court see any respect in which the
states' preferred system would cause real inconvenience to carriers.
Thus it was "unreasonable for the Commission to favor the interests
of [carriers] in a manner that wholly undermines those of the
[states].

1 47

As we evaluate the court's exegesis of the possible distinction between Chevron step two and arbitrariness review, it will be useful to
distinguish between the court's two rationales. The second rationale
is a classic example of reasoned decisionmaking review, conventionally viewed as bearing on whether the agency action was arbitrary and
capricious. To that extent, NARUC was no different from Rettig and
other cases examined in Part III.A., in which Chevron step two has
been held to encompass that sort of judicial inquiry.
The NARUC court's first rationale, however, is more reminiscent
of the "belatedly recognized clear meaning" cases examined in Part
IV.B., because it too has the flavor of statutory construction. More
particularly, it is an example of a lengthy body of D.C. Circuit precedents that have invalidated administrative actions because the agency
took an overly narrow view of its legal authority and therefore erroneously failed to exercise its discretion. 148 These precedents, which can
be traced back to classic Supreme Court cases such as SEC v. Chenery
Corp.,149 bear a close kinship to the ordinary fare of step one review.
Indeed, virtually by definition they implicate a legal determination regarding which the agency cannot claim to have used its discretion.
One can, if one prefers, label the issue abuse of discretion 150 or step
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. United States EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 740 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Kamargo Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 852 F.2d 1392, 1398 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. ICC, 826 F.2d 1125, 1128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1987); International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 707-08 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 792 F.2d 1165, 1169-70 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Process Gas Consumers Group v. United
States. Dep't of Agric., 694 F.2d 778, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc); Herz, supra note 59, at 22830.
149. 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). A slightly more apposite early precedent, involving an agency's
misinterpretation of a statute (rather than, as in Chenery, the common law) and consequent failure to exercise discretion, is Federal Communications Comm'n v. RCA Communications, Inc.,
346 U.S. 86, 91-96 (1953).
150. I have myself described this judicial doctrine as an element of abuse of discretion doctrine. See Levin, Lessons of 1995, supra note *, at 662.
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two, but the label has, or should have, no real bearing on the essential
nature of the court's task. Once again, there would seem to be no
logical reason why either the methods of construction or the degree of
deference displayed in such a case should differ from a typical step
one case. Sometimes, indeed, the court does approach the issue under
15 1
step one.
NARUC makes a particularly worthwhile "vehicle" for analysis
here, because the court used its opinion as an occasion for some general reflections about the relationship between Chevron step two and
arbitrariness review. Judge Silberman acknowledged the considerable
overlap between the two review standards. 152 He also suggested, however, that they are not interchangeable, because each may be more
appropriate to a different kind of case:
When Congress' instructions are conveyed at a high level of generality, an agency is not likely to consider its action as an "interpretation" of the authorizing statute, nor is that action likely to be
challenged as a "misinterpretation." (Yet even then, the agency
would be expected to assert that a particular decision was shaped by
the general policy concerns that animated the legislation.) When,
on the other hand, the statute is quite specific, agency action normally is evaluated in terms of how faithfully it follows the more detailed direction; in such cases the question is more obviously
whether the agency permissibly interpreted the statute. In any
event, the more an agency purports to rely on Congress' policy
choice-as set forth in specific legislation-than on the agency's
generally conferred discretion, the more the question before the
court is logically treated as an issue
of statutory interpretation, to be
153
judged by Chevron standards.
In disposing of the case before it, the court declined to classify its
reasons for rejecting the ICC copy rule as falling within either Chevron step two or arbitrariness review, because this was "a case that
overlaps both administrative law concepts. ' 154 Of course, that was
true in a straightforward sense. As we have seen, the holding rested
on two alternative grounds; the court relied in part on an arbitrariness
151. See, e.g., American Petroleum Inst., 906 F.2d at 740:
EPA concluded that the terms of the RCRA left it no choice but to disclaim authority
to prescribe treatment standards for [zinc-bearing] slag [resulting from metals reclamation] .... It follows that we can uphold EPA's construction of the statute only if the
agency's exercise of authority over the slag was indeed foreclosed by the RCRA under
Chevron step one.
152. See NARUC, 41 F.3d 721, 726-27 (1994); see also Laurence H. Silberman, ChevronThe Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 827 (1990) ("It may well be that
the second step of Chevron is not all that different analytically from the APA's arbitrary and
capricious review.").
153. 41 F.3d at 727.
154. Id. at 728.
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rationale and in part on a rationale that was unambiguously interpretive (termed step two by the court, although I would call it a step one
issue). But the court's dictum concerning the respective roles of "interpretation" and of arbitrariness review, suggesting a continuum or
spectrum extending between them, seems less helpful. The discussion
may be descriptively accurate, but I am not sure how a court would
actually make use of the suggested continuum if it wanted to try.
In light of my discussion in the preceding section, I would
reformulate the court's argument. In any given case, the court must
decide how far it will express its views "as a matter of law" on the
substantive issues in the case, and how far it will, instead, treat the
issues as a matter of discretion and consider whether the agency used
that discretion rationally. The court has to draw this line regardless of
whether it prefers to characterize its "interpretive" role as a step one
or step two exercise. The line it draws has real-world significance,
because to the extent that the court expresses its position in "legal"
terms, the agency would have much more difficulty departing from
that position afterwards. 155 In a given case, the court's choices about
how far the statute should be read as tying the agency's hands can be
challenging, as the substantive disagreement between Judges Buckley
and Silberman in NRDC v. Reilly aptly illustrates. 156 At least, however, this way of posing the problem emphasizes its practical aspect,
and judges may be best able to deal with it effectively in those terms.
Conceptual conundrums about whether the agency's position sounds
more like interpretation than discretion, or vice versa, are probably
less likely to be helpful, because most cases involve elements of
both. 157
D. Farfetched Result
One final category of Chevron step two reversals remains to be
examined. In this category a court holds that an agency's interpretation is "unreasonable" not because of a clear mandate in the statute,
and not because of a lack of thorough consideration (the typical basis
155. See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763, 768-69 (1996) (stating that judicial precedents constrain sentencing commission interpretations under the doctrine of stare decisis,
notwithstanding deference policies, but commission may abandon old approaches "within its
sphere to make policy judgments"); Herz, supra note 59, at 226-28 (discussing effect of Chevron
on agencies' freedom to depart from judicial precedents).
156. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
157. To some degree, indeed, Judge Silberman was clearly mindful of this fact, as may be
seen from the sentence in parentheses in the above block quote from NARUC. See supra text
accompanying note 153.
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for a "reasoned decisionmaking" reversal), but simply because the
court finds the interpretation farfetched. Of course, judges usually
prefer, when they override agencies' statutory interpretations, to
claim that they are enforcing the will of Congress, not their own policy
preferences. But even though the Supreme Court has never used the
Chevron framework to set aside an agency action on a pure "farfetched result" basis, the same is not true in the lower courts.
A D.C. Circuit case that does appear to fit this paradigm is Republican National Committee ("RNC") v. Federal Election Commis-

sion ("FEC").158 The case concerned a provision of the Federal
Election Campaign Act that requires political committees to use their
"best efforts" to induce donors who contribute more than $200 to furnish certain information (name, address, occupation, and employer)
for reporting purposes. An FEC rule implementing this mandate directed committees to send follow-up inquiries to donors who failed to
supply the information initially. The follow-up requests, as well as the
original solicitations, had to state that "federal law requires political
committees to report the [information] for each individual."' 159 The
court found that the rule passed Chevron step one, because the statutory term "best efforts" was ambiguous, but that it was so unreasonable that it failed step two. "We simply do not believe," the court said,
"that Congress authorized the Commission to forbid political committees from accurately stating the law."11 60 Not only was the required
statement erroneous, but it might mislead donors to believe that they
were obligated to supply the information, which was not so.
"Although the mandatory statement's language may well produce
the Comhigher reporting rates, we doubt that Congress authorized 161
donors.'
misleading
by
purpose
this
accomplish
mission to
It is not absolutely certain that RNC fits the paradigm under discussion, because, as the quoted sentences show, the court did phrase
its conclusion in terms of what Congress had authorized. Nevertheless, the court developed its argument without relying directly on the
language, structure, or policies of the Act. It focused squarely on the
absurdity of the government's insisting that committees must lie to
their donors. Moreover, the internal structure of the RNC opinion
leaves no doubt that the court meant to distinguish between its Chevron analysis (which included the holding just described) and an arbi158.
159.
160.
161.

76 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406.
Id.
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trariness analysis. 162 I will assume, therefore, that RNC does illustrate

the type of holding with which this section is concerned.
Step two reversals on this basis are very rare. In fact, RNC is the
only clear-cut example that I have found in my reading of the numerous decisions in which the D.C. Circuit has applied the Chevron
formula over more than a dozen years' time.1 63 Nevertheless, as we
round out our survey of step two case law, the reasoning exemplified
by the RNC case deserves attention. It may be the most natural and
straightforward way to read Chevron's admonition that at step two the

reviewing court must determine whether the agency's interpretation
was "reasonable." Probably many people believe that the courts,
when they apply the second Chevron step, ought to be looking for this
kind of error, even though it will seldom be found. In fact, Professor
Gary Lawson has argued that an inquiry of this sort-what he calls an
"outcome test"-should constitute the only focus of Chevron step

two. 164 He conceives of an outcome test as being entirely unconcerned with the reasoning the agency used to support its interpreta-

162. See id. at 404-07 (court's Chevron analysis); id. at 407-09 (court's arbitrariness analysis).
163. An arguable additional example is Resolution Trust Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), which held that the RTC lacked statutory authority to subpoena private papers from
banking executives for the purpose of determining whether they had sufficient net worth to
warrant suing. Although the court said that the agency's interpretation was unreasonable, id. at
949, its opinion relied heavily on a careful analysis of the Fourth Amendment case law and is
probably best read as resting on the principle that statutes should bc construed so as to avoid
constitutional infirmity.
164. See Lawson, supra note 4, at 325-26, 338. This characterization of Professor Lawson's
views may not be entirely fair, because to some degree he appears to contemplate that Chevron
step two should be understood as a test of "reasonableness" that looks neither to the bare policy
consequences of the agency action (considered apart from the statute itself) nor to the quality of
the reasoning by which the agency supports its interpretation (which he regards as the proper
province of arbitrariness review). See id. at 341-42. This is a somewhat .unfamiliar notion, but
Lawson seems to be building on an earlier article in which he explored the possibility of treating
legal reasoning as subject to standards of proof that are analogous to the standards used to
decide issues of fact. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859 (1992). An
attempt to evaluate this possibility would take me into deeper jurisprudential waters than befits
the focus of this article.
However, assuming that such a model could be devised, Lawson has not seriously attempted
to demonstrate why this notion of "reasonableness" would improve the judicial review system in
some way, such as by making it more logical, easier to understand, more effective in imposing
necessary discipline on agencies, or more effective in securing agencies' autonomy. As he himself recognized in his earlier article, a justification of Chevron must rest on "normative considerations of judicial administration and political theory." Id. at 885. The same is true when one
wants to justify any particular version of Chevron. Except for one fleeting policy argument,
which I address infra at note 170, he does not venture into that territory. Thus, I see Lawson's
theoretical model as a path that the law might have taken but has not, and for which the case has
not been made. On the other hand, his model is at least functionally similar, albeit not identical,
to the rationale of RNC, and the skepticism I will express about the value of separating "outcome" from "process" issues, see infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text, has some bearing on
his views as well.
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tion. In this manner he would sharply distinguish step two from
arbitrariness review, which he thinks should concentrate on what he
calls "process" concerns-essentially, the cogency of the agency's
reasoning.
Obviously the "farfetched result" approach to Chevron step two
should be used cautiously (if at all). But in the extreme case in which
a court might use it as a basis for reversal, does this approach exemplify an attractive role for Chevron step two that step one review and
arbitrariness review cannot fulfill equally well? I think not, for two
principal reasons.
First, consideration of whether an agency's position is farfetched
is already a legitimate component of both of those two modes of review. After all, the "traditional tools of statutory construction," which
a court is supposed to consult when applying Chevron step one, include the maxim that the legislature must be presumed not to intend
an absurd result. 165 Indeed, that reasoning may well be the optimal
path to decision when a court wants to rely on the deplorable consequences of the agency's interpretation in combination with other conventional interpretive techniques, such as arguments from statutory
language, history, and structure. Similarly, attention to whether the
tangible result of an agency's action is reasonable has always been a
component of arbitrariness review. When the Court said in Overton
Park that a reviewing court applying the arbitrary and capricious test
should ask whether the agency displayed a "clear error of judgment,"
it seemed to have precisely this sort of inquiry in mind. 166 "Indeed,
examination of whether an agency has made a truly unpalatable discretionary choice is perhaps the most traditional function of 'arbitrary
and capricious' review."'1 67 The recent rise of the hard look doctrine
has tended to eclipse this judicial role, but one sees little indication
that the growth of the hard look (a development that, after all, was
intended to augment the courts' control over agency action) has also
operated to purge arbitrariness review of its original meaning.
165. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1994); Public
Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 450-53 (1989); Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989); id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring); Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate
Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978).
166. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 416 (1971), citing, e.g., Louis
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 182 (1965) ("[A] minute speck of
dust on a window pane would hardly support a refusal [to license a dairy] based on
uncleanliness.").
167. Levin, Restatement Report, supra note 16, at 254 (citing ICC v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215
U.S. 452, 470 (1910), as an early example of review for "unreasonableness" as distinct from
review for legal error).
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Second, if courts were to proceed on the assumption that "outcome" is the concern of Chevron step two and "process" is the concern of arbitrariness review, I do not believe that judicial review
doctrine would be improved. This would be an unhealthy development, because "outcome" issues and "process" issues should not be
analyzed in isolation from each other. They work best when considered in tandem. An agency's duty of reasoned decisionmaking is not a
command to engage in lengthy discussion for the sake of lengthy discussion. It is an obligation to deal meaningfully with issues that might
otherwise be troublesome enough to raise doubts about the rationality
of the agency's position. 168 Thus, the questionable policy consequences of an agency's chosen interpretation are among the factors
that give direction to a court's implementation of the reasoned decisionmaking standard. We can see this interplay at work in, for example, the NARUC court's second reason for rejecting the ICC's copy
rule: the enforcement system that the agency envisioned as an alternative to the states' traditional enforcement approach looked so "quixotic" that "the Commission must explain how such an alternative
169
could possibly substitute" for the states' preferred approach.
In short, to the extent (if any) that a court is prepared to take the
policy wisdom of an agency's decision into account during judicial review, that consideration ought to occur in conjunction with either conventional statutory construction or the reasoned decisionmaking
standard, instead of being spun off into a doctrinal "test" of its own.
Nothing need turn on whether, in a given case, the court refers to
"Chevron step two" or "arbitrariness" as the review standard that implicates both questions about the agency's explanation and questions
about the soundness of the agency's policy. What matters is that
courts ought to face these two kinds of questions simultaneously, not
separately. 170 The rarity of cases like RNC suggests that this is exactly
what judges, at least in the D.C. Circuit, are already doing.
168. Courts exercising the power to reverse for inadequate explanation should normally
be expected to specify some weakness in the agency's decision and to make a credible
argument that this weakness might, unless more fully justified, warrant a conclusion
that the action is substantively arbitrary. Thus, the typical logic of the court's argument
Beis as follows: "We detect an apparent problem with the agency's rationale ....
cause we detect this potential abuse of discretion, the agency must justify its position
more fully."
Id. at 262-63.
169. NARUC, 41 F.3d at 728; see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
170. In arguing for separate treatment of the two issues, Professor Lawson reasons as
follows:
[I]t is probably the better part of valor to keep the distinction clear by limiting Chevron's reasonableness test to review of outcomes and leaving process review to the fa-
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CONCLUSION

After more than a dozen years, the second step in the Chevron

standard of review remains ill-defined. Undoubtedly a major part of
the explanation for this haziness is that, although the Supreme Court's
opinion spoke of ground rules for "statutory interpretations," the internal logic of the Chevron formula made it directly relevant to judicial review of exercises of administrative discretion-a class of

determinations that are analytically quite different from "interpretations" in the conventional sense. The sweep of the Chevron test has
made it difficult to implement, because the Court made no serious

effort to integrate its two-step formula with the arbitrariness standard
of the APA, which covers much of the same territory.

To this day the Court has remained largely, though not totally,
oblivious to the overlap it was creating between these two constructs. 171 In general, indeed, the Court-which from the outset was
probably less committed to the Chevron formula than many observers
assumed-has preferred to leave the test open-ended, declining to remiliar "hard look" standard. Courts and lawyers are then less likely to misunderstand
or misapply the relevant process test. The "hard look" doctrine, after all, is familiar to
judges and administrative lawyers; the trick is simply to get them to apply that familiar
doctrine to agency legal conclusions. Chevron is confusing enough, without making the
step two reasonableness requirement perform double-duty as both an outcome test and
a process test.
Lawson, supra note 4, at 343-44. Unlike Lawson, I am not persuaded that "getting [judges and
administrative lawyers] to apply [the hard look] doctrine to agency legal conclusions" is particularly difficult. I have observed no real reluctance on the courts' part to give serious consideration to well-supported contentions that particular agencies have failed to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking. I would thus question the factual predicate of his argument against making
Chevron step two (or for that matter arbitrariness) "perform double-duty." Moreover, if avoiding confusion is the issue, I would suggest that the courts' effort to devise separate roles for
Chevron step two review and arbitrariness review is itself one of the main sources of confusion in
current doctrine. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text. The thesis of this article is that
they have little or no reason to make this effort in the first place.
171. Occasionally, as in Chevron itself, the Court has shown a degree of awareness of the
overlap. See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1734 (1996) (cross-referencing to section of opinion that applied Chevron reasonableness test and calling it a discussion
of whether interpretation was arbitrary and capricious); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187
(1991) ("We find that the Secretary amply justified his change of interpretation with a 'reasoned
analysis,' [and thus] we must defer to the Secretary's permissible construction of the statute.").
But this is exceptional. More representative of the Justices' inattention to the relationship between Chevron step two and arbitrariness review is the Court's opinion in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992). One issue in that case was whether,
under step two, the Court could defer to an interpretation that was merely implicit, yet clearly
discernible, in the agency's opinion. The Court gave an affirmative answer, id. at 418, 419-20, but
appeared to regard the question as novel and difficult. Had the Court approached the case as
involving arbitrariness review, that question would have been easy. The Court could simply
have invoked the longstanding principle, familiar in the arbitrariness context, that a reviewing
court should "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be
discerned." Bowman Transp., Inc., v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974).
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solve very much about the scope of review of legal issues in administrative law. Given the complications of the subject matter, that
reticence has perhaps been wise. But the practical result is that most
of the work of ironing out the internal tensions in the Chevron test has
gone on elsewhere.
In this article, accordingly, I have studied the development of
Chevron step two in the D.C. Circuit. That court's large administrative law caseload and strong commitment to domesticating the Chevron formula for routine use have made it a uniquely apt laboratory for
observation of the implementation of the two-step test. This article
has outlined the manner in which the circuit has recognized the natural overlap between Chevron step two and arbitrariness review and
has built up a body of case law predicated on that perception. The
overlap itself is now well established in D.C. Circuit case law, and the
administrative law community ought to take more notice of this development than it apparently has.
At the same time, one continues to see warnings in the D.C. Circuit case law that the overlap must be less than total, for interpretation and discretion are different. I, on the other hand, have suggested
that when Chevron step one and arbitrariness review are given the
scope that they intrinsically warrant, there is no judicial business left
over to be resolved within the exclusive province of Chevron step two.
It is too late in the day to simply abrogate the second step as excess
baggage; the prestige of the Chevron formula makes such a development unlikely. But courts could achieve roughly the same result by
simply extending the "overlap" theme to its logical conclusion and declaring that Chevron step two and arbitrariness review are equivalent
to each other.
Even that much is likely to be a hard sell, at least in the short run.
The habit of thinking about Chevron and arbitrariness review in separate conceptual boxes is deeply entrenched. Still, one might reasonably expect to hear more about "overlap" over time, and less about
"divergence," as these doctrines continue to evolve.
The skeptical reader may have doubts about the social utility of
my analysis-a pure exercise in attempted clarification, with no aspiration to promote either more deferential or more intrusive judicial
review. Yet its neutrality may be exactly what gives the analysis, or at
least parts of it, the potential for acceptance. One can hardly expect
judicial consensus on such momentous issues as the appropriate balance of power between courts and agencies in the elaboration of regu-
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latory statutes. Judges do, however, share an interest in striving to
develop a coherent analytical framework within which they can bring
their philosophical differences to bear on the resolution of individual
cases. The function of an academic study like the present one is to
publicize trends and to raise critical questions that may force more
careful reflection on the elusive dynamics of Chevron review. With
broader understanding of what is at stake may come a broader consensus about the proper terms of the debate.

